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Golden: Riparian Rights under the Texas Water Rights Adjudication Act - A

RIPARIAN RIGHTS UNDER THE TEXAS WATER
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION ACT-A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
STEPHEN L. GOLDEN
In 1967, subchapter G of chapter 5 of the Texas Water Code became
effective.' This enactment, statutorily referred to as the Texas Water
Rights Adjudication Act,2 was designed to define and control existing water
rights within the state and was in response to a constitutional mandate
that the legislature enact laws for the development, control, preservation,
and conservation of the state's natural resources.'
In its declaration of policy, the legislature states that the adoption of the
Texas Act is in the exercise of the police powers of the state and is necessary for the protection of public welfare. 4 It is the purpose of this comment
to analyze those parts of the Act which affect riparian rights in an attempt
to determine whether the provision effects a lawful exercise of the police
power, or whether it sanctions, instead, an unconstitutional expropriation
of real property.
ORIGIN OF THE RIPARIAN RIGHT IN TEXAS

The riparian water right is derived from common law. In England the
proprietor of each bank of a stream had an equal right to use water which
flowed in the stream. The right was a vested property interest which could
be divested only upon proof of an uninterrupted adverse possession for a
period of twenty years.5 The original Spanish and Mexican land grants in
Texas did not carry with them riparian water rights, except where there
was a specific grant of riparian right by the sovereign.' In 1840, however,
the Republic of Texas adopted the English common law and, accordingly,
the doctrine of riparian water rights.! As such, all grants of land by the
state from 1840 through July 1, 1895, carried with them riparian rights. In
1895, however, Texas reverted to the civil law and, in so doing, provided
1. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. i§ 5.301-.409 (1972).

2. Id. § 5.301.
3. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
4. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.302 (1972).

5. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 114, 117 (K.B. 1832); Wright v. Howard, 57 Eng. Rep.
76, 82 (V.C. 1823).
6. See State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 855, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio, 1961), aff'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962) (extensive survey of Spanish and
Mexican land grants in Texas).
7. Tex. Laws 1840, an Act to Adopt the Common Law of England, at 3, 2 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 177 (1840).
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that land granted by the state after July 1, 1895, did not include riparian
rights.'
The riparian right is one of use only; it does not carry with it ownership
in the corpus of the water itself.' It is inherent in and a part of the land,
based on the theory that the land through which water runs receives benefits and is increased in value by reason of its accessibility to the water. 0
Riparian rights can attach only to waters below the "line of highest ordinary flow."" Under the common law, as it has been applied in Texas, the
riparian proprietor's rights extended to the reasonable use of the riparian
waters. Initially, this use was reasonable even though it may have injured
the owner of lower riparian lands. 2 The reasonable use became limited,
however, so that the owner had no right to use the water in such a way as
to cause substantial injury to the common right of other riparian owners. 3
The riparian right has consistently been considered a vested property
right in Texas. 4 As such, it is protected by the constitution, and an owner
15
thereof cannot be deprived of this right without compensation.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN TEXAS

As recognized in the policy declaration in the Texas Water Rights Adjudication. Act, 8 "[tihe conservation and best utilization of the water resources of the state are a public necessity."' 7 It is only natural in a semiarid state, such as Texas, that the use and distribution of water should be
8. Tex. Laws 1895, ch. 21, § 1, at 21, 10 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

751 (1895).

9. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 129, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1935); Texas
Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 25, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (1927); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304,
309 (1863).
10. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 128, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1935);
Parker v. El Paso Water Improvement Dist., 116 Tex. 631, 642, 297 S.W. 737, 742 (1927); Haas
v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588, 589 (1856).
11. Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 102, 286 S.W. 458, 472 (1926). "The 'line of highest
ordinary flow' is the highest line of flow which the stream reaches and maintains for a
sufficient length of time to become characteristic when its waters are in their ordinary,
normal, and usual condition, uninfluenced by recent rainfall or surface run-off." Id. at 111,
286 S.W. at 468-69.
12. Tolle v. Correth, 31 Tex. 362, 365 (1868).
13. Great Am. Dev. Co. v. Smith, 303 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957,
no writ); see Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 100, 286 S.W. 458, 470 (1926); Stacy v. Delery, 122
S.W. 300, 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).
14. Chicago R.I. & G. Ry. v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 123
Tex. 432, 448, 73 S.W.2d 55, 64 (1934); Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 64-65, 228 S.W. 543, 545
(1921); Tolle v. Correth, 31 Tex. 362, 365 (1868).
15. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock
Co., 100 Tex. 192, 201, 97 S.W. 686, 688 (1906); Zavala County Water Improvement Dist. v.
Rogers, 145 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no writ).
16. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.301 (1972).
17. Id. § 5.302.
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a matter for legislative control. This concern is not new to Texas, but has
manifested itself in several attempts at adopting an adjudication and administration system.
The first such legislative initiative towards controlling the water supply
in Texas was the enactment of the Irrigation Act of 1917.11 Based on the
"Wyoming System," the Act imposed upon the Board of Water Engineers
the duty to make an administrative determination of the rights of various
claimants to the waters of a stream." In addition, the Act provided that
any suit brought to determine rights to the use of such water could be
transferred to the Board of Water Engineers for a final determination. 0
In that same year the legislature passed article 7592,1 which provided
that an appropriator who filed a claim with the Texas Water Board was
given the right to acquire title by limitation against unused rights of a
riparian owner. 2 Neither the Irrigation Act of 1917 nor article 7592 were
long-lasting. In 1921 the Texas Supreme Court overruled the Irrigation Act
as being an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to empower the
Board of Water Engineers, an administrative agency, with the authority
to make final judicial determinations of vested property rights. In striking
down the adoption of the "Wyoming System," the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that Wyoming did not accept the common law doctrine of riparian rights, whereas Texas not only recognized such a common law right,
but also treated it as an interest in real property. 4 Ten years later, article
7592 was also found to be unconstitutional.25 The Galveston Court of Civil
Appeals held that the statute allowed condemnation without adequate
compensation and, thus, operated to divest a riparian owner of a part of
his vested property rights in an impermissible manner."
It was not until the late 1940's that further efforts were made toward
enacting laws to control the use of water. In 1949 a bill was introduced
setting forth a proposed water code, but it failed to pass the committee
stage. 7 In 1964 the Texas Research League made a study of the Texas
Water Commission and recommended changes in order to safeguard the
18. Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 88, §§ 1-140, at 211-43.
19. Id. § 105, at 235.
20. Id. § 105, at 235.
21. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7592 (1917).
22. Id.
23. Board of Water Eng'rs v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 92-93, 229 S.W. 301, 303 (1921).
24. Id. at 92, 95, 229 S.W. at 304, 306. A subsequent opinion by the Texas Supreme Court
in Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 513, 186 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1945) grants the Railroad
Commission power to make administrative adjudications in oil and gas matters. This opinion
indicates that the "Wyoming System" would be found to be constitutional today.
25. Freeland v. Peltier, 44 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
26. Id. at 409.
27. TEx. S.225, 51st Legis. (1949).
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state's water resources." Its report concluded that an adjudication system
was needed. Finally, in 1967, the Sixtieth Legislature enacted the Texas
Water Rights Adjudication Act, 9 a statute based on Oregon's water control
system.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS UNDER THE TEXAS WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION ACT

The Texas Act provides for limitation of the riparian owner's rights in
several separate provisions. First, the Act recognizes riparian claims in
water, for purposes other than domestic or livestock use, as extending to
only that amount of water which the riparian owner beneficially used
during the years 1963 through 1967.10 Second, the Act requires the riparian
owner to file a claim on or before September 1, 1969, describing the beneficial use he has made of the water.3 Finally, the Act provides that failure
of the riparian owner to have filed a claim extinguishes
and bars any claim
32
to water which he might have previously had.
These limitations on the riparian property right raise some substantial
constitutional problems. The Act, in recognizing riparian rights only to the
extent which they are applied to beneficial use, abrogates the prior vested
riparian right to all reasonable uses of the water. Further, the provision for
recognition of only those beneficial uses to which the water is applied
during the years 1963 through 1967 serves to bar any claim by the riparian
owner to uses made before 1963, and precludes him from asserting his right
to water for any future, additional uses. The Act also extinguishes any
riparian right, without compensation, upon failure by the riparian owner
to file a claim in compliance with the statute, thus repudiating the concept
that riparian rights are vested property rights.
The legislature, in its declaration of policy, asserts that the promulgation of the Act is in the exercise of the police power of the state.3" Therefore,
28. Booth, Adjudication of Water Rights-A General Discussion of Water Rights and
Recent Legislation to Administer Water Rights in Texas, in WATER . .. AND THE NEW TEXAS
LAW 41 (1968).
29. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.301 (1972).

30. Id. § 5.303(b). That section provides: "Any [riparian claim] shall be recognized only
. to the extent of maximum actual application of water to beneficial use without waste
during any calendar year from 1963 to 1967, inclusive." Id. § 5.303(b). Use of water for
domestic or livestock purposes is expressly excluded from the effect of the Texas Water Rights
Adjudication Act. Id. § 5.303(1).
31. Id. § 5.303(c). Section 5.303(c) provides: "On or before September 1, 1969, every
person claiming any water right to which this section applies shall file with the commission
a statement..." establishing particular facts about the owner's claim.
32. Id. § 5.303(i), which provides that: "Since the filing of all claims to use public water
is necessary for the conservation and best utilization of the water resources of the state, failure
to file a sworn statement in substantial compliance with this section extinguishes and bars
any claim of water rights to which this section applies."
33. Id. § 5.302.
*

.
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what must be established in support of its constitutionality is that the
nature of the riparian right is such that it is subject to modification and
extinction by the operation of the state's police power.
POLICE POWER AND THE OREGON ACT OF 1909

The basis of the police power is public necessity; the proper exercise of
that authority by the legislature rests on the need for safety, health, security, and protection of the general public welfare." The exercise of that
power by the legislature is, however, circumscribed by constitutional limitations designed to protect private property rights."
As no recent Texas case has ruled on the constitutionality of modification and abrogation of riparian rights under the banner of the police power,
it is necessary to consider other juridictions which have studied the issue.
This analysis begins with an examination of the creation and subsequent
judicial treatment of the Oregon Act of 1909,8 which was the basis of the
Texas Act.37
Before 1909 the riparian owner in Oregon had the right to the flow of the
stream only to the extent actually needed and used." Thus, the common
law doctrine of riparian rights, prior to enactment of the statute, was
recognized only to a limited extent;"9 the measure of that right was the
amount of water which was put to beneficial use. In order to ascertain the
amount of unclaimed water which might be available for appropriators and
to make certain the extent of any riparian rights claimed, Oregon enacted
a statute in 1909 designed to enable the state to determine these facts."0
The statute defined a vested right as that "actual application of water to
beneficial use prior to February 24, 1909 . . . provided such right has not
been abandoned for a continuous period of two years."' In order to determine the amount of water needed and used by such a riparian owner, the
amount of land irrigated, the character of the soil, and the amount of water
34. Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 357, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921); Jefco, Inc. v.
Lewis, 520 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); City of Coleman
v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1949, writ refld).
35. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 19.
36. OR. REv. STAT. § 539.010 (Supp. 1975).
37. Booth, Adjudication of Water Rights-A General Discussion of Water Rights and
Recent Legislation to Administer Water Rights in Texas, in WATER. . . AND THE NEW TEXAS
LAW 42 (1968).
38. Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083, 1098 (Ore. 1909); see Whited v. Cavin, 105 P. 39a, 401
(Ore. 1909).
39. In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 516 (Ore. 1914), modified, 146 P. 475 (Ore. 1915);
Hedges v. Riddle, 127 P. 548, 549 (Ore. 1912); see Fitzstephens v. Watson, 344 P.2d 221, 226
(Ore. 1959).
40. Pacific Livestock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1916).
41. OR. REv. STAT. § 539.010(1) (Supp. 1975).
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needed per acre had to be established. 2 Thus, the legislature also provided
that each claimant had to file a statement and submit proof of his claims,
and that failure to make such application resulted in forfeiture of all rights
to the use of water previously claimed by him.43
The constitutionality of the Act of 1909 was challenged in 1924, in the
case of In re Hood River.4 4 The Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that
the riparian doctrine in their state, prior to the adoption of the Act of 1909,
was a modified form of the common law.45 The court concluded, therefore,
that it was within the province of the legislature to define the vested right
of a riparian owner as being limited to that water which he put to beneficial
use, since such a definition was consistent with the historical nature of
riparian rights within the state." In support of this holding, the court
stated that the common law riparian doctrine may be altered by statute,
provided that such legislation does not affect some vested right.47 The
Oregon statute was subsequently tested in the case of California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co.48 In that case the Ninth Circuit,
like the Supreme Court of Oregon in Hood River, held that the modification of rights effectuated by the statute was not a drastic change from the
former riparian law of the state and, hence, did not constitute a taking of
property without due process of law.4"
Unlike Oregon, the common law doctrine in Texas before enactment of
the Texas Act in 1967 was not based on a beneficial use criterion. As stated
earlier, the riparian doctrine existing in Texas at the time that the statute
was enacted gave the riparian owner the right to any reasonable use of the
water. The right was a vested property right, constitutionally protected
from expropriation without compensation. The Oregon statute was found
to be constitutional because its limitation to beneficial use was a mere
statutory enactment of what had been their common law interpretation.
42. In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 517 (Ore. 1914), modified, 146 P. 475 (Ore. 1915);
Hedges v. Riddle, 127 P. 548, 549 (Ore. 1912).
43. OR. REv. STAT. § 539.210 (Supp. 1975).
44. 227 P. 1065 (Ore. 1924).
45. Id. at 1086; see In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 516 (Ore. 1914), modified, 146 P. 475
(Ore. 1915).
46. In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (Ore. 1924).
47. Id. at 1087.
48. 73 F.2d 555, 568 (9th Cir. 1934), aff'd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935); ct
United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist. 330 F.2d 897, 905 n.9 (9th Cir. 1964) (discussing
application of case to Washington law), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
49. California-Ore. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555, 568 (9th Cir.
1934), aff'd on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
50. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); see Chicago R.I. & G. Ry. v. Tarrant County
Water Control & Improvement Dist., 123 Tex. 432, 448, 73 S.W.2d 55, 64 (1934); Zavala
County Water Improvement Dist. v. Rogers, 145 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1940, no writ).
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The Texas Act, however, cannot be justified on similar grounds, since the
Texas law prior to enactment of the statute did not limit the riparian
owner to beneficial use but, rather, gave him a vested right in all water
put to a reasonable use.5
In Oregon the requirement of filing a claim to protect such a vested right
was a natural result of that state's prior modified common law interpretation of riparian rights, as this was the only way in which a vested right
could be determined to exist. In Texas, however, such a filing requirement
does not naturally arise out of the prior reasonable use doctrine but, instead, out of the new beneficial use criterion imposed by the statute. In
order for the filing requirement to be deemed constitutional, the modification of the riparian right to beneficial use must first be justified. It is
apparent, therefore, that the constitutionality of the Texas Act cannot be
successfully supported by the decisions in favor of the Oregon Act.
POLICE POWER AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

California
California, like Texas, has a dual system of water rights under which
both riparian and appropriative rights are recognized. Before 1919 the
riparian proprietor in California was entitled to the reasonable use of waters passing through his land. 52 This right was a vested right, inherent in
the land, and could not be taken from the riparian owner except upon
payment of due compensation. 3 In 1913 the California Legislature passed
a statute attempting to limit the riparian right to that amount of water
put to beneficial use and, also, providing that the riparian right to such
water not beneficially used for a period of ten consecutive years was forfeited.54 The statute came under judicial review in the case of Herminghaus
v. Southern California Edison Co.55 The Supreme Court of California recognized the riparian right to reasonable use of the water in its usual and
ordinary course and stated that such right could neither be gained by use
nor lost by disuse. 6 In holding in favor of the riparian owner, the court
stated that:
51. See Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 100, 286 S.W. 458, 470 (1926); Great Am. Dev. Co. v.
Smith, 303 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ).
52. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 616 (Cal. 1926); Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 704 (Cal. 1886).
53. Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n, 138 P. 997, 1001 (Cal. 1914); Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674,
704 (Cal. 1886); see Northern Light & Power Co. v Stacher, 109 P. 896, 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1910).
54. 1913 Cal. Stats., ch. 586, § 11, cited in Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
252 P. 607, 621 (Cal. 1926).
55. 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926).
56. Id. at 616; see Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d
972, 988-89 (Cal. 1935); Spring Valley Water Co. v. Alameda County, 263 P. 318, 321 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
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[T]o concede that the state Legislature has the right arbitrarily to fix . . .
the amount of water which the riparian proprietor may take and use thereon
would be to concede . . . to the legislative department of the state government the arbitrary power
to destroy vested rights in private property of every
7
kind and character.5
The constitutionality of the act was litigated again in Fall River Valley
IrrigationDistrict v. Mount Shasta Power Corp.5" There the Supreme
Court of California found that the power of the legislature to modify or
abrogate a rule of common law does not give it the power to take away a
previously vested property right.59 In holding in favor of the riparian owner
and against the legislature's exercise of police power, the court, in both
cases, based its decision on the fact that the rights being litigated involved
the private property rights of individuals and did not concern the property
rights of the public as a whole. The court suggested that if the state was
seeking to uphold an effort to establish a general plan in the interest of the
entire public, then perhaps the police powers might rightfully be invoked. °
This dictum tends to support a limitation of riparian rights through the
proper exercise of the police power for the benefit of the public as a whole.
In 1935, however, the court considered the constitutionality of the legislature's provision for forfeiture of riparian rights upon ten years' nonuse,11
and it concluded that riparian rights are not such as may be lost by statutory forfeiture.2
The holdings by the court in Herminghaus and Fall River Irrigation
Districtprecipitated a movement for amendment of California's state constitution in an attempt to circumvent the court's refusal to allow the inposition of restrictions on the riparian right. 3 In 1928 an amendment was
passed providing for the adoption of a beneficial use water system in California and recognizing the rights of a riparian owner to no more of the flow
than was used for beneficial purposes. 4 The provisions of the amendment
relating to limitation of riparian rights were challenged as being unconstitutional shortly after it was adopted, the riparian owners arguing that the
amendment should not be applied retroactively since that would amount
57. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 622 (Cal. 1926).
58. 259 P. 444 (Cal. 1927).
59. Id. at 449; accord, Miller v. McKenna, 147 P.2d 531, 536 (Cal. 1944).
60. Fall River Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 259 P. 444, 449-50
(Cal. 1927); Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 623 (Cal. 1926).
61. Tulare Irrigaton Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 988-89
(Cal. 1935).
62. Id. at 989; cf. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289, 294 (Cal. 1943)
(statute has no application to pueblo rights).
63. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1950) (riparian rights
to seasonal overflow of stream).
64. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
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to a taking of vested property rights without compensation. 5 The court
upheld the constitutionality of the amendment as'a reasonable exercise of
the police power and, as such, a lawful abridgment of the riparian right
for which the riparian owner is not entitled to compensation." The court
recognized, however, that while the amendment limits the riparian owner
to reasonable beneficial use, it expressly protects not only his present needs
but, also, any prospective beneficial requirements. 7
The issue of depriving a riparian owner of rights which had previously
been vested, without compensation to him, was subsequently addressed by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Gerlach Livestock
Co. 8 The Court found that in adopting the 1928 amendment, California
confiscated a private property right for which the riparian owner was entitled to compensation. 9 The Court recognized that the right of the riparian
owner before the amendment was to have the unintercepted flow of the
water and that such right may not be divested.7" In discussing the question
of compensation for loss of private property rights, the Court stated that
the public welfare requires claimants to sacrifice some of their uses, but it
does not require that their loss be uncompensated. 7
It is apparent that the California courts' experience with limitation of
riparian rights has more heavily favored the riparian owner than it has the
exercise of the police power by the legislature. Essentially, it is recognized
in California that the riparian owner's rights may be limited to beneficial
use, but such limitation may not be imposed without adequate compensation for any property taken as a result." Furthermore, the courts did not
permit the California Legislature to provide for forfeiture of the riparian
rights merely upon the happening of the specific conditions set forth by the
statute.
Kansas
While the California decisions concluded that legislative attempts to
extinguish vested riparian rights were unconstitutional, the Kansas courts
have found that their legislature's limitation of riparian rights was a valid
exercise of the police power.73
65. Tulare Irrigaton Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 987-88
(Cal. 1935).
66. Id. at 988; Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 17 (Cal. 1933).
67. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989 (Cal.
1935); see Albaugh v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 73 P.2d 217, 224 (Cal. 1937).
68. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
69. Id. at 753; see Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1967).
70. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 753-54 (1950).
71. Id. at 752-53.
72. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1967); see United States
v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 754-55 (1950).
73. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962); see Emery v. Knapp,
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Initially, Kansas accepted the reasonable use theory as its basis for
determining the nature and extent of the vested riparian right. 4 In 1945,
however, the legislature enacted the Water Appropriation Act,'7 which
recognized riparian rights as being vested in only that amount of water
having been applied to beneficial use as of June 19456 and providing for
termination of any right not put to beneficial use for three consecutive
years." The provision recognizing riparian rights only in that amount of
water applied to beneficial use was further extended by the Kansas Supreme Court so as to restrict the riparian owner's vested right to only that
amount of water having been beneficially used on or within three years
before June 1945.8 The Kansas Act did recognize, however, that a riparian
claimant is entitled to compensation by an appropriator for any damages
resulting from the taking of his property. 9
In a landmark case testing the constitutionality of the act, the Supreme
Court of Kansas upheld the legislature's limitations of vested riparian
rights on the ground that it allowed the common law claimant relief by
proper compensation for restrictions imposed upon his rights. 0 A federal
court subsequently stated that, in Kansas, the mere modification of the
doctrine of riparian rights is not, in and of itself, a deprivation of equal
protection without due process of law, and in order for the riparian owner
to recover compensation, he must demonstrate that damages were actually
suffered. 8' In a more recent decision, the Kansas Supreme Court again
upheld the constitutionality of that state's act as a valid exercise of the
police power. 2 The court initially addressed itself to the modification of
the riparian right through adoption of the beneficial use theory, and it
concluded that it was within the authority of the legislature to define the
207 P.2d 440, 447-48 (Kan. 1949).

74. Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571, 585 (Kan. 1905); see Heise v. Schulz, 204 P.2d 706, 710
(Kan. 1949).
75. KAN. STAT. §§ 82a-704 to -725 (1969).
76. Id. § 82a-701(d).
77. Id. § 82a-718.
78. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 591 (Kan. 1962).
79. KAN. STAT. § 82a-716 (1969). This section provides in part that "[i]f any appropriation, or the construction and operation of authorized diversion works results in an injury to
any common-law claimant, such person shall be entitled to due compensation in a suitable
action at law against the appropriator for damages proved for any property taken." In essence,
the statute appears to be conferring on private persons the right of eminent domain. The
constitutionality of such a provision as relating to riparian rights in Kansas has not been

tested.
80. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440, 448 (Kan. 1949).
81. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan.), aff'd 352 U.S. 863 (1956);
see Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962).
82. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962). Although the case applies

to groundwater, the court stated that the same principles would also apply to surface water.
Id. at 590.
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vested rights of water users.8" In support of its holding, the court stated
that the riparian owner's right is to the use of the water and not to the
water itself, and hence, legislation restricting the right to its use is not
objectionable."4 The court then considered the restriction placed on vested
rights by the legislative recognition of only those beneficial uses made
within three years prior to 19455 and the provision for extinguishment of
those rights not put to beneficial use for three consecutive years. 8 While
the court recognized these provisions could have the effect of taking property by legislative fiat, it concluded, nevertheless, that there was adequate
constitutional protection since the act provided for a cause of action for
damages in favor of a common law owner who has not initiated any beneficial use of water against an appropriator for property taken.81
South Dakota
The Kansas Act was deemed constitutional primarily because it provided the riparian owner with a cause of action for compensation for any
property rights taken. South Dakota, however, has restricted riparian
rights without allowing for compensation to the riparian owner. South
Dakota enacted a water rights statute in 19558 substituting the beneficial
use doctrine for the reasonable use theory, which had been the previous
basis of its vested riparian right.8 8 The South Dakota Act defines a vested
riparian right as that amount of water beneficially used on March 2, 1955,
or within the three years immediately preceding that date. 0 As such, the
act not only restricts previously vested rights but also extinguishes those
vested rights not exercised within the given period.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld the act as a proper exercise
of the police power, stating that the public welfare requires protection of
the water supply, and that the legislature was acting within its authority
83. Id. at 594.
84. Id. at 594-95.
85. KAN. STAT. §§ 82a-701(d), 82a-718 (1969). The act defines a vested right as extending
to the use of water "having actually been applied to any beneficial use, including domestic
use, on or before June 28, 1945." Id. § 82a-701(d). It also provides for termination of every
water right when no "beneficial use is henceforth made of the water under such right for three
successive years." Id. § 82a-718. Apparently the court is construing these two provisions
together. Recognition is extended to only those beneficial uses made within three years prior
to 1945. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 591 (Kan. 1962).
86. KAN. STAT. § 82a-718 (1969).
87. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962); see Cities of Hesston &
Sedgwick v. Smrha, 391 P.2d 93, 94 (Kan. 1964).

88. S.D.

COMPILED LAWS ANN.

§§ 46-1 to -5 (1967).

89. See St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch Co., 143 N.W. 124, 127 (S.D. 1913)
(abrogates attempt by legislature to adopt the beneficial use doctrine and to terminate all
water rights not put to beneficial use prior to 1907).
90. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-9 (1967).
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in providing for conservation and preservation of that natural resource."
More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court sustained that decision
as being constitutional, provided that vested rights of a landowner, acquired at the time of passage of the statute, are protected. 2 While this
statement seems to indicate that the court is recognizing those riparian
claims in existence before adoption of the Act, it is clear from the remainder of the opinion that the only vested rights which could have been acquired at the time of passage of the statute would be in those beneficial
uses made during the period 1953 through 1955 .3 Thus, South Dakota has
sustained its legislature's limitation and extinction of riparian rights as a
proper exercise of the police power.
North Dakota
North Dakota has also adopted a water rights statute 4 that alters its
former reasonable use doctrine, which had previously been held to be a
vested property right." The North Dakota Act applies the beneficial use
theory and provides for recognition of riparian rights only to the extent to
which they were beneficially used as of the date on which the legislation
was enacted. In upholding the validity of the act, the North Dakota
Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that there is no absolute
ownership in water which has not actually been used, and it concluded,
therefore, that the legislature had acted within its police power since the
regulation of water rights was for the public welfare. 7
DECISIONS OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS APPLIED TO THE TEXAS ACT

This analysis of authority from other jurisdictions reveals that the trend
in the western semi-arid states is toward an adoption of the beneficial use
theory of water rights. What does not emerge from this examination is a
uniform method of effecting a changeover from prior reasonable use doctrines.
The California decisions indicate that the riparian owner is entitled to
compensation for water losses resulting from abrogation of the reasonable
91. Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711-14 (S.D. 1964) (applying the act to underground water); see Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (S.D.
1973).
92. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239, 245 (S.D. 1970).
93. Id. at 246; S.D. COMPLILED LAWS ANN. § 46-1-9 (1967).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE'§§ 61-01-01 to -23 (1960).
95. Bigelow v. Draper, 69 N.W. 570, 573 (N.D. 1896); see Johnson v. Armour & Co., 291
N.W. 113, 116 (N.D. 1940); McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 165 N.W. 504, 505
(N.D. 1917).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
97. Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 732-33 (N.D. 1968).
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use doctrine and adoption of the beneficial use theory,9" and that the legislature may not deprive the riparian owner of any future beneficial uses of
the water. 9
It might be argued that the California Supreme Court's decision that
riparian rights may not be lost by statutory forfeiture'0 should not be
followed in Texas since the riparian right in Texas is an incorporeal hereditament and is therefore subject to abandonment. ' "' It would follow, then,
that the provisions of the Texas Act simply define the criteria for determining whether abandonment has occurred. It is a well-established rule in
Texas, however, that abandonment of an incorporeal hereditament requires proof of the owner's actual intent to abandon, in addition to establishing his nonuse of that right.' °2 Thus, it is clear that even if it were shown
that the Texas Act was merely providing for abandonment of an incorporeal right, the statute would fail under this theory because there can be
no such abandonment without proof of the requisite intent.
The conclusion to be drawn from the California courts' holdings is that
the riparian right is not subject to diminution by the legislature's exercise
of police power, except upon providing for compensation to the property
owner. Apparently, such compensation would be paid by the state as an
exercise of eminent domain. An adoption of the California policy by the
courts of Texas would necessitate a finding that the Texas Water Rights
Adjudication Act is unconstitutional since it provides for both a limitation
and an extinguishment of prior vested riparian rights without compensation.9, 3
98. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 753-55 (1950); Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist. 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1967).
99. United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 193 F. Supp. 342, 347 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. LindsayStrathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989 (Cal. 1935).
100. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 988-89
(Cal. 1935).
101. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S 983 (1956); Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 64, 228 S.W. 543,
545 (1921); Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 316 (1863); see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 129, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1935). The fact that the riparian right is an
incorporeal hereditament is not settled law in Texas. An early Texas case indicated that the
riparian right was a corporeal interest in real property, holding that it is a part of the land,
not in the nature of an easement. Fleming v. Davis, 37 Tex. 173, 201 (1872). Such a determination is supported by decisions in other jurisdictions. E.g., Cary v. Daniels, 46 Mass. 236,
238 (1842); Water Power & Control Comm'n v. Niagra Falls Power Co., 1 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917
(Sup. Ct. 1938); Akron Canal & Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 50 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App.
1943).
102. Dallas County v. Miller, 140 Tex. 242, 245, 166 S.W.2d 922, 924 (1942); see Adams
v. Rowles, 149 Tex. 52, 58, 228 S.W.2d 849, 852 (1950). But see Hicks v. City of Houston, 524
S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (inference of
intent to abandon arises out of long, continued, and unexplained failure to use).
103. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.303(b), (c), (i) (1972).
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The courts of Kansas and North Dakota upheld the constitutionality
of their statutory enactments of the beneficial use doctrine on grounds
that the riparian owner's property right is in the use of the water and
not in the water itself.04 In Texas such an argument in favor of the constitutionality of the Texas Act would be untenable. While it is true that
the Texas riparian owner's right is one of use and not ownership, 10 his right
is a property right which is protected by the constitution.' Another distinction between the Kansas Act and the Texas Act is that the former
provides the damaged riparian owner with a cause of action against an
appropriator of prior water rights,' while the latter allows no cause of
action for compensation, either public or private. The fact that the Kansas
Act allows for compensation was the basis for the Kansas Supreme Court's
holding that those provisions of the act which limited or terminated a prior
vested right were constitutional.'"8 While it may be questioned whether
providing the damaged property owner with a remedy against private appropriators satisfies constitutional requirements for compensation, it is
clear that such relief is more equitable than none at all. Hence, neither the
decisions of Kansas nor those of North Dakota, holding that the adoption
of the beneficial use doctrine was a proper exercise of the police power, can
support the constitutionality of the Texas Act.
It appears, however, that the South Dakota experience with modification of riparian rights does support the Texas Act. There, it was held that
such limitation was a valid exercise of the police power, even though no
compensation was provided for lost property rights.' When weighed
against the reasoning of the decisions in California, Kansas, and North
Dakota, though, the holding of the South Dakota court is not compelling.
CONCLUSION

In Texas the riparian right has long been recognized as a property right
in the nature of a right in the land itself.' 0 The Texas Water Rights Adjudi104. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 594-95 (Kan. 1962); Baeth v. Hoisveen,
157 N.W.2d 728, 732 (N.D. 1968).
105. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 129, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1935).
106. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock
Co., 100 Tex. 192, 201, 97 S.W. 686, 688 (1906); Zavala County Water Improvement Dist. v.
Rogers, 145 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no writ).
107. KAN. STAT. § 82a-716 (1969).
108. Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 593-94 (Kan. 1962); see Cities of Hesston
& Sedgwick v. Smrha, 391 P.2d 93, 94 (Kan. 1964).
109. See Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239, 245 (S.D. 1970);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711-14 (S.D. 1964).
110. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dodd, 125 Tex. 125, 129, 81 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1935);
Parker v. El Paso Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 116 Tex. 631, 643, 297 S.W. 737, 742-43
(1927); Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 64, 228 S.W. 543, 545 (1921).
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cation Act provides for modification of the reasonable use doctrine, which
had long served as the benchmark for determining the vested property
interest of the riparian owner. Furthermore, the act provides for nonrecognition of any riparian right for purposes other than domestic or livestock
use, to the extent that it was not applied to beneficial use during the period
1963 through 1967 or for which no claim was made in accordance with the
statute.
While it is axiomatic that the public welfare can require a degree of
servitude on the part of a vested property owner in order to preserve the
physical and economic health of society, it is manifest that when the public
needs demand acquisition of a vested property right, the owner of that
right is entitled to compensation. It would be reasonable to impose a beneficial use restriction on the riparian owner and thus prevent any waste that
might have been permissible under the reasonable use theory. It would
then be proper for the state to require a filing of these riparian claims, in
order that it might determine what is, and what is not, a beneficial use.
Such would be a reasonable exercise of'authority over vested property
rights and, therefore, would be compatible with the notion of the police
power. But to allow the legislature to confiscate the property rights of
riparian owners who have either not put their right to beneficial use over
the designated five year period or who have failed to comply with statutory
filing requirements would be to sanction a wrongful abridgment of their
constitutional guarantees. "Public interest requires appropriation; it does
not require expropriation.""'
111. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 753 (1950).
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